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CRPDPeople with a mental illness may be subject to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD), depending on deﬁnitions of terms such as ‘impairment’, ‘long-term’ and the capaciousness of the
word ‘includes’ in the Convention's characterisation of persons with disabilities. Particularly challenging under
the CRPD is the scope, if any, for involuntary treatment.
Conventionalmental health legislation, such as theMental Health Act (England andWales) appears to violate, for
example, Article 4 (‘no discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability’), Article 12 (persons shall ‘enjoy legal
capacity on an equal basiswith others in all aspects of life’) and Article 14 (‘the existence of a disability shall in no
case justify a deprivation of liberty’).
Weargue that a formofmental health law, such as the Fusion Lawproposal, is consistentwith the principles of the
CRPD. Such law is aimed at eliminating discrimination against persons with a mental illness. It covers all persons
regardless of whether they have a ‘mental’ or a ‘physical’ illness, and only allows involuntary treatment when a
person's decision-making capability (DMC) for a speciﬁc treatment decision is impaired — whatever the health
setting or cause of the impairment — and where supported decision making has failed. In addition to impaired
DMC, involuntary treatment would require an assessment that such treatment gives the person's values and
perspective paramount importance.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
This paper addresses the question of whether involuntary treatment
of persons with a mental illness is compatible with the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and if so,
in what circumstances.
Relevant aspects of the CRPD will be described, focussing on the
challenges it presents to involuntary treatment. It is proposed that the
principles underlying a form of law, known as the ‘Fusion Law’, are con-
sistent with the CRPD. The Fusion proposal was animated by the aim of
countering the discrimination that is inherent in conventional forms of
mental health legislation. It allows for involuntary treatment under
certain, tightly circumscribed conditions. These involve considerations
of ‘decision-making capability’ and a version of ‘best interests’, concepts
subject to different understandings, but that we will deﬁne so far as
necessary to progress the argument.'s College London, De Crespigny
ler).
 license.2. The UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities
The CRPDwas passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations
inDecember 2006. By February 2013, it has been signed by 155 countries
and ratiﬁed by 127. It sets out key rights that citizens with a disability
should enjoy in a fair society. It is one of the nine core human rights
treaties of the UN. The overall purpose, stated in Article 1, is to “promote,
protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote
respect for their inherent dignity”. The elimination of discrimination by
ensuring that rights may be enjoyed on an equal basis with others is a
fundamental aim. While, arguably, most of the rights in the CRPD are al-
readyprotected by otherUN treaties, theCRPD frames rights in away that
is speciﬁc for peoplewith disabilities, a group of persons rarely referred to
in those other treaties (Bartlett, 2012; Lawson, 2006). Noteworthy was
the formal, active involvement of disabled people's organisations, includ-
ing the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, in the
drafting and negotiations behind the CRPD.
‘Disability’ is not formally deﬁned in the CRPD, allowing individual
State Parties considerable latitude in how they deﬁne disability in their
domestic law. People with disabilities are characterised as follows:
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical,
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with
1 Annual report of the High Commissioner for HumanRights to the General Assembly.
A/HRC/10/49, presented 26 January 2009, para 48-9. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/UDHR/Documents/60UDHR/detention_infonote_4.pdf. Accessed 26 July 09.
2 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Sixth Session 19-23 Sept 2011.
Concluding observations.
3 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Fifth Session 11-15 April 2011.
Concluding observations.
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an equal basis with others. The use of the word ‘include’ in the statement
above allows for a non-exhaustive descriptionof ‘disability’ that is not set-
tled; neither are the meanings of terms such as ‘long-term’ and ‘impair-
ments’. It is accepted by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities that people with a ‘mental illness’ (referred to as having a
‘psychosocial disability’) fall under the Convention. Whether all people
with a ‘mental illness’ are appropriately considered as having a ‘disability’
is a moot question. It raises larger philosophical and sociological issues as
regardswhat itmeans todraw together thedomains ofmental health and
disability (andmental health politics and disability politics). For instance:
does someone who has intermittent and short-lived episodes of mental
distress and disability, constituting temporary departures from their ‘nor-
mal self’ (when they have no diagnosable mental illness nor disability),
have a ‘disability’ in linewith the CRPD?What is the nature of the ‘impair-
ment’ in mental illness? If a person receives any diagnosis from (any)
classiﬁcatory manual of mental disorder, are they de facto a person with
a disability under the CRPD? Can the discrimination consequent on
being diagnosed with a mental illness constitute a disability? Do people
withmental illness identify with the idea that they are ‘persons with dis-
abilities’? Is the ‘social model of disability’ — which as we shall see later,
clearly shapes the deﬁnition of persons with disabilities in the CRPD —
adequate as regards the conceptualization of mental illness and mental
distress? Discrimination against people with mental illness is certainly
rife; but to what extent is it best explored through the prism of disability
in contrast to, for example, stereotypes involving ‘dangerousness’? These
are important unsettled, questions, but for the purposes of this paper we
set them aside and accept that, at the very least, people with a long-term
serious mental illness will fall within the scope of the CRPD.
The CRPD contains the classic array of civil and political rights, such as
the right to liberty (Article 14) and integrity of the person (Article 17),
rights to freedom of expression (Article 21) and privacy (Article 22), the
right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment (Article 15), and
rights to equal recognitionbefore the law (Article 12) andaccess to justice
(Article 13). It also includes economic, social and cultural rights that have
come to prominence since the Second World War, including the right to
home and family life (Article 23), the right to education (Article 24),
and rights to health (Article 25), habilitation and rehabilitation (Article
26). Some of these rights have been framed so as to have particular rele-
vance to people with disabilities: the right to non-discrimination (Article
5), the right to independent living and community inclusion (Article 19),
the right to personal mobility (Article 20), the right to work and employ-
ment (Article 27), the right to participation in cultural life (Article 30) and
the right to be free from exploitation and abuse (Article 16).
Countries are placed under a variety of obligations to takemeasures to
modify or abolish existing discriminatory laws, regulations and practices,
as well as to provide programmes to support the rights of persons with
disabilities (Article 4). These obligations include, for example, a duty to
provide appropriate training regarding disability issues to those involved
in the administration of justice (Article 13), concrete programmes to as-
sist people with disabilities and their caregivers to recognise and combat
exploitation (Article 16), obligations to provide community support ser-
vices (Article 19), and overarching duties on states to raise awareness of
disability issues (Article 8) and to combat discrimination (Article 5).
Appendix A sets out in full those Articles (12, 14, 17, 25) that will be
most frequently referred to in our discussion of whether involuntary
treatment can be consistent with the CRPD.
The Convention establishes the UN Committee on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities. States Parties are required on a periodic basis to
report to the Committee on their progress in implementing the Conven-
tion, and the Committee in turn publishes comments about this prog-
ress. Crucially, Article 33 of the Convention requires governments to
ensure that representatives of civil society, in particular persons with
disabilities and their representative organisations, are fully involved in
monitoring the implementation of the Convention. Furthermore, for
states that have ratiﬁed the optional protocol, individuals who considerthemselves victims of violations of the Convention will be able to make
formal complaints for determination by the Committee.
In some countries that have ratiﬁed the CRPD, such as the UK and
other case law countries, the Convention is not part of its domestic
law unless incorporated into law by legislation. So it is not binding on
its domestic courts, but like any other international convention to
which a state is party, it can be referred to by courts and can be used
to interpret domestic law. Inmanyother ratifying countries theConven-
tion is binding as part of domestic law. The reports of the Committee on
national progress in implementation will be public, and may create po-
litical pressures nationally and internationally. When a State Party has
signed theOptional Protocol, a side agreement to the Convention, it rec-
ognises the competence of the Committee on the Rights of Personswith
Disabilities to examine complaints from individuals. As of February
2013, therewere 90 signatories and 76 parties to this Optional Protocol.
For individual complaints, determinations also will be public. The
United States has signed, but not ratiﬁed, the CRPD; China has both
signed and ratiﬁed. How effective the Committee on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities will prove remains to be seen.
3. Involuntary treatment and the CRPD
Oneaspect of the CRPD appears to be particularly challenging to con-
ventional mental health practice. This concerns involuntary treatment.
Along with the general right to liberty, similar to that contained in
other human rights instruments, it provides that ‘the existence of a
disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.’ (Art. 14(1)(b)).
The Ofﬁce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights adopts a
robust view of this provision, as it applies to psychiatric detention:
‘[48.] … Article 14, paragraph 1 (b), of the Convention unambiguously
states that “the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a depriva-
tion of liberty”. Proposals made during the drafting of the Convention to
limit the prohibition of detention to cases “solely” determined by dis-
ability were rejected. As a result, unlawful detention encompasses situ-
ations where the deprivation of liberty is grounded in the combination
between a mental or intellectual disability and other elements such as
dangerousness, or care and treatment. Since such measures are partly
justiﬁed by the person’s disability, they are to be considered discrimina-
tory and in violation of the prohibition of deprivation of liberty on the
grounds of disability, and the right to liberty on an equal basis with
others prescribed by article 14’.1
On this account, ‘mental disorder’ or ‘mental illness’, even if it com-
prises only one of a number of necessary criteria for involuntary deten-
tion, makes that set of criteria incompatible with Article 14, that a
disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2011 in
its ‘concluding observations’ following consideration of reports submit-
ted by Spain2 and Tunisia3 echoed this interpretation.
For Spain:
’36. The Committee recommends that the State Party: review its laws
that allow for the deprivation of liberty on the basis of disability, includ-
ing mental, psychosocial or intellectual disabilities; repeal provisions
which authorise involuntary internment linked to an apparent or diag-
nosed disability; and adopt measures to ensure that health care services
including all mental health care services are based on informed consent
of the person concerned’;
and, for Tunisia:
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provisions which allow for the deprivation of liberty on the basis of dis-
ability, including a psychosocial or intellectual disability.28. The Com-
mittee is concerned about the lack of clarity concerning the scope of
legislation to protect persons with disabilities from being subjected to
treatment without their free and informed consent, including forced
treatment in mental health services.
We shall return to the comments concerning informed consent later,
but it is clear that these interpretations place current involuntary treat-
ment regimes under increasing scrutiny.
Minkowitz (2006, 2011) argues that involuntary treatment is ruled
out entirely. She argues Article 12, that persons shall ‘enjoy legal
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’, by making no
explicit reference to ‘substitute decision making’ in any of its subsec-
tions, rejects it. Earlier drafts of Article 12 did make reference to substi-
tute decisionmaking, but thesewere dropped because agreement could
not be reached about the implications of its inclusion.Minkowitz (2011)
states: “A provision recognizing substituted decision‐making would have
overcome the general principle of equal legal capacity, and the obligation
to ensure that measures related to legal capacity respect the will and pref-
erences of the person, constituting an explicit exception. In the absence of
such an exception, the plain meaning must prevail without reading in the
exception that was rejected”. She also interprets Article 14 as did the
Commissioner for Human Rights in the quotation given above. Article
17, in recognising that personswith disabilities have the ‘right to respect
for physical andmental integrity on an equal basis with others’, Minkowitz
argues, prevents treatment being given without consent. She points out
that the CRPDReportingGuidelines for Article 17 require State Parties to
report onmeasures taken to protect personswith disabilities frommed-
ical (or other) treatment given without free and informed consent. The
‘ConcludingObservations’ from the Committee on Spain and Tunisia ap-
pear to support her point. Arguing further, Minkowitz (2011) points out
that Article 25(d) requires that health professionals ‘provide care of the
same quality to persons with disabilities as to others, including on the
basis of free and informed consent…. ‘, and that reading Article 25 in con-
junctionwith Article 12 indicates that the “consent of third parties is not
substituted for that of persons with disabilities, who at all times enjoy
the right to exercise legal capacity according to their own will and
preferences”.
Some backgroundmay help an understanding of the key issues here
(for details, see Dhanda, 2006). One of the most important aims of the
CRPD is the elimination of discrimination against people with disabil-
ities. Especially requiring remedy is the loss for many disabled persons
of their rights, often encompassing virtually every sphere of their lives,
to act according to their choices and preferences following their place-
ment under forms of guardianship. Decisions are then made for them
according to judgements and preferences that are not theirs. It is clear
that in very many instances the legal criteria and safeguards governing
such guardianship are highly unsatisfactory, for example, orders being
made without the knowledge of the person subject to them, removing
automatically a large array of rights, having nodeﬁned time limit or pro-
visions for appeal (Drew et al., 2011). The social model of disability
adopted by the CRPD holds that ‘disability’ is not an attribute located
within an individual but that it ‘results from the interaction between
persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers
that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal
basis with others’, and that with support of varying degrees, these sig-
niﬁcant barriers can be counteracted. Thus State Parties are required
to provide a raft of actions to remove the barriers, including the aboli-
tion of discriminatory laws.
Undoubtedly, in relation to long-term disabilities, such as those
resulting from sensory or intellectual impairments or chronic health
conditions, the proposed measures to counter discrimination are
highly appropriate. However, what is not clear is how far this thinking
applies to persons who experience sudden or potentially short-termimpairments— often reversible with treatment, social support or elaps-
ing of time— that signiﬁcantly affect their decision-making capabilities.
In this paper we are especially concerned about treatment decisions
carrying the potential for extremely serious consequences. There are
two issues here. The ﬁrst concerns whether ‘disability’ as characterized
in the CRPD applies to shorter-term impairments of decision-making
capability. Is there a distinction to bemade between this kind of impair-
ment and those more conventionally associated with ‘disabilities’? If
there is a distinction, how does it apply to those who do have a long-
term disability, for example, an intellectual disability, but who also
have an impairment of treatment decision-making capability, either
short-term (that is, superimposed on a long-term disability) or long-
term? The second issue is under what circumstances, if any, it would
be appropriate for another person, duly appointed, to make decisions
on behalf of a person with a signiﬁcantly impaired decision-making
capability and how such a judgement should be made.
The second issue caused much controversy in the development of
the CRPD, especially the framing of what eventually became Article
12, dealingwith ‘legal capacity’ — that persons shall ‘enjoy legal capacity
on an equal basiswith others in all aspects of life’. Direct reference to the
possibility of decision-making by another person on behalf of a disabled
person, even as a last resort, is not made, though there were arguments
that it should be. Article 12(4), the result of attempts at achieving con-
sensus, perhaps by remaining silent on some issues, is ambiguous but
can, arguably, be read as implying that such interventions are not en-
tirely excluded. It refers to safeguards that
‘......shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity
respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conﬂict
of interest and undue inﬂuence, are proportional and tailored to the per-
son's circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject
to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority
or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to
which such measures affect the person's rights and interests’.
These ‘safeguards’ might suggest the possibility of something be-
yond safeguarding supported decision-making.
We shall argue that there is an important conceptual distinction to
be made between DMC for a time and task speciﬁc treatment decision
as opposed to a ‘disability’. Furthermore, that we need to recognise
that there are circumstances of signiﬁcantly impaired DMC where de-
spite best efforts at supported decision-making, this is not possible. In
such circumstances, treatment that is administeredwithout the consent
of thepersonmight on occasion be justiﬁable.Wepropose that a formof
‘capability-based’ law, narrowly drawn, is consistent with the CPRD in
providing for involuntary treatment that is non-discriminatory.
4. A clinical–empirical argument that a comprehensive impaired
DMC-based law is consistent with the principles underlying the CRPD
The following conditions would need to bemet for a ‘disability-neu-
tral’ mental health law under the terms of the CRPD
• ‘Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy, including the
freedom to make one's own choices, and independence of persons’.
(Article 3 (a))
• No ‘discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability’ (Article 4).
• Persons shall ‘enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in
all aspects of life’ (Article 12.2).
• The ‘existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of
liberty’ (Article 14.1 (b))
• ‘Every personwith disabilities has a right to respect for his or her phys-
ical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others’ (Article 17)
• Health professionals to provide ‘care of the same quality to persons
with disabilities as to others, including on the basis of free and in-
formed consent’ (Article 25(d))
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(amended in 2007) does not meet the requirements of the CRPD. First,
involuntary treatment is based on ‘status’, that is, suffering from a ‘men-
tal disorder’ — that is, a form of disability under the terms of the CRPD.
Second, this status is then coupledwith a ‘risk’ criterion— posing a dan-
ger to self or to others. Third, except in a few instances, involuntary
treatment can be given without taking into account the patient's right
to exercise legal capacity. It is presumably precisely this form of legisla-
tion that the Ofﬁce of the UNHigh Commissioner for Human Rights was
referring to when concluding that States Parties
[49] “must……. repeal… provisions authorizing institutionalization of
persons with disabilities for their care and treatment without their free
and informed consent, as well as provisions authorizing the preventive
detention of persons with disabilities on grounds such as the likelihood
of them posing a danger to themselves or others, in all cases in which
such grounds of care, treatment and public security are linked in legis-
lation to an apparent or diagnosed mental illness. This should not be
interpreted to say that persons with disabilities cannot be lawfully sub-
ject to detention for care and treatment or to preventive detention, but
that the legal grounds upon which restriction of liberty is determined
must be de-linked from the disability and neutrally deﬁned so as to ap-
ply to all persons on an equal basis.4 ”
The last sentence indicates that it is the High Commissioner's opin-
ion that the CRPD does not completely exclude involuntary treatment.
If it were excluded altogether it would be seriously at variance with a
widespread moral intuition (expressed in rights to life and health)
that there are certain circumstances (including, for example, coma) in
which treatment should be provided to a person who as a result of an
impairment of mental functioning cannot make treatment decisions
for himself or herself.
However, any criteria for involuntary treatment under the CRPD
must benon-discriminatory and ‘disability-neutral’.We accept the posi-
tion of the High Commissioner that when one arm of any set of neces-
sary criteria for involuntary treatment is the presence of a ‘mental
illness’ or ‘mental disorder’ (that is, a form of disability), unacceptable
discrimination is introduced.
4.1. An example of a comprehensive DMC-based law
Dawson and Szmukler (2006) and Szmukler, Daw, and Dawson
(2010) have proposed a form of law that is explicitly driven by the
aim of removing discrimination against people with a mental illness. It
is intended to apply to all persons, whatever their diagnosis (if they
have one), whether they have a ‘mental disorder’ or not, who are unable
through a lack of DMC to make a treatment decision for themselves.
(We now use the term ‘decision-making capability’ (DMC) and not ‘ca-
pacity’ in order to make it clear that it is distinct from the term ‘legal
capacity’). An impairment of DMC is not a ‘status’ attribute, that is,
based on a diagnosis of a disorder or category of disability, but is a ‘func-
tional’ attribute, that is, based on the inability to carry out a speciﬁc task
at a speciﬁc time. Separate legislation authorising the civil commitment
of ‘mentally disordered’ persons is argued to be unnecessary and dis-
criminatory, and should be replaced by new, comprehensive legislation
that would govern all non-consensual treatment. This new scheme de-
scribed as the ‘Fusion Law’ proposal is based squarely on impaired
decision-making capability principles: that is, on the impaired capabili-
ty of a person to make a decision about treatment, from whatever
cause — whether this be owing to schizophrenia, Alzheimer's disease,
a confusional state — for example, post-operative, due to infection or4 Annual report of theHigh Commissioner for HumanRights to theGeneral Assembly. A/
HRC/10/49, presented 26 January 2009, para 48-9. See alsoUN, Ofﬁce of theHigh Commis-
sioner for HumanRights ‘Personswith Disabilities’Dignity and Justice for DetaineesWeek,
Information Note No. 4, (2008) p. 2. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/
Documents/60UDHR/detention_infonote_4.pdf. Accessed 26 July 09.after an epileptic seizure, a cerebrovascular accident, a head injury, or
any other cause of a disturbance or impairment of mental functioning.
Wewill not in this paper venture in detail into themost appropriate
criteria for the assessment of DMC. Szmukler, Daw and Dawson have
opted for a modiﬁed version of the deﬁnition given in the English Men-
tal Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). In relation to a treatment decision, DMC
requires the ability to understand and retain information relevant to
the decision, and the ability to ‘use, weigh or appreciate’ that informa-
tion in the process of making that decision. This involves an apprecia-
tion that the information is relevant to the person's predicament, and
the ability to use that information to generate and think through the
consequences of having or not having the treatment in relation to the
person's values and life choices. A criticism of this kind of test is that it
is unduly ‘cognitive’, taking little account of emotion or values consider-
ations when those are seen by most people, intuitively, as being impor-
tant (see, for example, Tan, Hope, Stewart, & Fitzpatrick, 2006). The
extent to which a test of DMC is necessarily ‘cognitive’ or ‘procedural’
is arguable. Banner (2010), for example, from a philosophical perspec-
tive, drawing onDonald Davidson'smethods for ‘Radical Interpretation’,
has argued that it is possible to take due account of a person's epistemic
and evaluative commitments within such a framework while retaining
a level of objectivity appropriate to the type of assessment required.
This kind of approach involves an important dialogue between the as-
sessor and the person whose DMC is being questioned. The assessor
explores what appears to be an unusual belief or value affecting a treat-
ment decision by expanding the discussion in an effort to reach an un-
derstanding of its coherence, or otherwise, within the wider system of
ideas and values held by the person. A belief or value cannot be treated
as an isolated attribute for assessment. Banner also goes on to discuss
ways in which beliefs and values may come to be judged to lack coher-
ence when viewed in this broader context, always accepting the fact
that many of our ideas and decisions are far from perfectly constructed.
Support for the person and consultationwith others who know the per-
son would enhance the assessment.
There may be a case for other criteria, for example, those presented
by Bach andKerzner (2010). They argue that the ability to express an in-
tention (or will) and its coherence with a sense of a personal identity
through time — that can be reliably discerned by an observer who
knows the person well — can characterise a level of ‘decision-making
capability’ that with support allows the person to make decisions that
exercise legal capacity. Thiswould be an example of ‘supported decision
making’. Bach andKerzner recognize another group of personswho lack
decision-making capability within their broader deﬁnition, in whom
their will and preferences cannot be adequately ascertained, and who
they describe as requiring ‘facilitated’ decision-making, that is, by
other persons, until the person's ‘will and preferences’, with the neces-
sary supports, can be established.5
A precise deﬁnition is not necessary for the purposes of the argu-
ment presented in this paper. The important point is that at the time a
person is required to make a speciﬁc treatment decision, they are not
capable of doing so, according to a set of agreed criteria that are consis-
tent with the principles of the CRPD. There is undoubtedly much con-
ceptual and practical work still to be done on impaired DMC, but we
see no other ethical basis for potentially intervening in a person's life
when their wellbeing appears to be seriously threatened by what ap-
pears, atﬁrst sight at least, to be a seriously imprudent decision or an in-
ability to make a decision at all.
The Fusion Law follows the MCA 2005 in requiring the person with
impaired decision-making capability to participate as much as is5 The criteria for ‘supported’ and ‘facilitated’ decision-making presented by Bach and
Kerzner appear to be highly appropriate, respectively, for persons with an intellectual dis-
ability and for persons in a coma or an extremely impaired cognitive state. The extent to
which they are applicable to people with mental illness, who may have an apparently
ﬁxed delusional idea or who feel compelled to respond to hallucinations, for example, is
not clear, but certainly merits investigation.
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to nominate a person to act as a decisionmaker if the patient should lose
DMC. Such a person could, in practice, take on a supportive role. The Fu-
sion Lawalso requires that an independent advocate be providedwhose
role is to support the person in having their voice heard. It would be
entirely consistent with the principles of the fusion law proposal for
it to be modiﬁed to incorporate a clear commitment to a ‘supported
decision-making’ model.
Under the Fusion Law, involuntary treatment can be given to an
objecting person only if there is a lack of DMC and, further, only if it is
in the ‘best interests’ (as described below) of the person. The reason
for the term ‘fusion’ in the law's description derives from the fact that
while it is fundamentally based on impaired DMC (as in the MCA
2005), conventional capacity-based legislation fails to adequately regu-
late some important aspects of involuntary treatment — for example,
how involuntary treatment, if it is in the ‘best interests’ of the person,
is to be authorised, by whom, for how long, how is it to be reviewed,
how often, what kind of appeals can be made, and so on. These aspects
are spelt out in detail in conventional civil commitment legislation, and
are in the Fusion Law, but are there merged with its DMC-based
foundation.
While it is unnecessary to delve into notions of ‘best interests’ in
great detail for the purposes of this paper, some important points
need making. If decisions are needed when a person has seriously
impaired DMC, some principles guiding those decisions are obviously
necessary. There is some confusion about the meaning of terms in this
area. We intend the following: the person who makes the decision is a
‘substitute decision maker’ (SDM) (or, perhaps better, following the
proposals of Bach and Kerzner (2010), a ‘facilitator’ (F)); when a deci-
sion is made according to what the SDM or F believes the person
would havemade if they hadDMC in the circumstances inwhich the de-
cision has to bemade, thiswould be a ‘substituted judgment’. This could
also be expressed as a decision giving expression to the person's ‘will
and preferences’. The term ‘best interests’ is used in the fusion proposal
in a sense that develops from that used in the Mental Capacity Act
(MCA) 2005: a complex judgement that is formed on the basis of a num-
ber of factors that the SDM must consider; these include the person's
past and presently expressedwishes, beliefs and values (and in particu-
lar a relevant written statement made when the person had capacity),
and factors that the person would have been likely to consider if they
had been able to; and, consulting with relevant people in the person's
life, including those nominated by the person, in order to assist in decid-
ing what it is likely that the person would want. Under the MCA, the
SDM must, so far as is reasonably practical, permit and encourage the
person to participate, or to improve the person's ability to participate,
as fully as possible in any act done or decision made. What we emphat-
ically do not mean by ‘best interests’ is that the SDM or F decides on the
basis of what he or she thinks is the right thing to do. The type of ‘best
interests’ we propose is a ‘subjective’ best interests, that is, one that
gives paramount importance to the values and preferences of the person.
While the MCA deﬁnition of ‘best interests’ has been generally well
received, there remain a number of difﬁculties. The factors listed above
having been considered, there is no guidance concerning how they are
to be weighed (Dunn, Clare, Holland, & Gunn, 2007). The Court of Pro-
tection, to which cases falling under the MCA are referred, has
attempted a balancing act between the person's expressed wishes and
the seriousness of the harms that would occur, were those wishes ac-
ceded to. The court has so far maintained that although the person's
past and current wishes and feelings are important factors to be taken
into account when assessing best interests they cannot be determina-
tive.6 The exception is an ‘advance decision’ to refuse treatment made
when the person had decision-making capacity. The problem is most
starkly played out where the person with a serious illness, especially6 For an example, see Munby J, In Re M (Statutory Will) [2009] EWHC 2525 (Fam).when young, expresses a strong and persistent wish to be allowed to
die (Richardson, 2013). However, a recent example of a ‘best interests’
approach recommended by the Victorian Law Reform Commission
(2012) in Australia represents a development of the MCA principles
and appears more in keeping with the CRPD. It is made clear that
SDMs promote the “personal and social wellbeing” of the person
when, as far as possible, they have paramount regard to making the
judgments and decisions that the person would make themselves
after due consideration if able to do so”. Consultation with others, the
maximal participation of the person, and taking account of their cultural
circumstances are also included. The full deﬁnition and guidance are
presented in Appendix B.
There is certainly more work to be done on the basis for a decision
when DMC is impaired, whether it be termed ‘best interests’, ‘subjective
best interests’, or perhaps ‘best interests according to will and prefer-
ence’, but the direction of travel is becoming clear.
It is interesting that in the ‘will and preferences’ approach of Bach
and Kerzner, DMC and ‘best interests’ are, in effect, merged. Assessment
of DMC is entailed in the attempt to establishwhat are the person's ‘will
and preferences’ in relation to a decision, while ‘best interests’, as we
would conceive it, is furthered by facilitating actions that accord with
the person's ascertained ‘will and preferences’. Furthermore, within
their schema, one could argue that the facilitated decision is not a
‘substituted’ one in an important sense, since it gives expression to the
person's ascertained ‘will and preferences’.
A further point is worth noting in relation to patients who experi-
ence episodes of psychosis, but who recover in between, indeed the
most common course taken by such illnesses. Here we have the inesti-
mable advantage — in comparison with end-of-life conditions — of
being able to discuss with patients, in the light of already experienced
episodes of illness, what their preferences would be if a relapse were
to occur. These might change over time; the person could ‘ﬁne-tune’
their preferences if they were to experience a further episode. There is
accumulating evidence that this kindof advance statement or joint crisis
planning can reduce the use of coercive interventions (Henderson et al.,
2004; Swanson et al., 2008).
5. Impaired capability and disability
A loss of DMC, (which should speciﬁcally include the inability of sup-
ported decision-making to help the person make a decision) is the nec-
essary entry criterion to consideration for involuntary treatment under
the Fusion Law proposal. As it is argued this law does not entail discrim-
ination against those with a disability, it is thus consistent with the re-
quirements of the CRPD. Important in this regard is the fact that the
Fusion Law applies to all persons, no matter what the cause of the im-
pairment of DMC, whether it is a so-called mental illness or physical ill-
ness. Furthermore, it applies equally to a person who does not have a
pre-existing condition associated with a disability as to one who does —
for example, equally to the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia
who loses DMC during a relapse of psychosis as to the previously ﬁt
young person who suffers a head injury in a motor car accident.
An objection might be raised that loss of DMC due to a disturbance
or impairment of mental functioning itself comprises a ‘disability’, and
thus could not form a valid, ‘disability-neutral’, criterion under the
CRPD for overriding a person's wishes. Thus, according to this argu-
ment, the ‘disability’, that is the loss of DMC, itself, would become the
reason for involuntary treatment and is on that account discriminatory
and thus incompatible with the CRPD (Bartlett, 2012). The problem
may be most troublesome in cases where a severe impairment of capa-
bility tomake treatment decisionsmay bemore or less permanent, as in
persons with very severe intellectual disability or dementia.
Let us examine this objection. An impairment of DMC is speciﬁc to a
particular decision that is necessary at a particular time. The notion of
‘blanket’ incapacity is, as the discussion of DMC above should make
clear, entirely rejected. In the vast majority of people with a mental
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most, or indeed all, of the time. It is usually at times of relapse only that
it may become impaired in people with, for example, schizophrenia or
bipolar disorder.
Even then, patients with a mental illness severe enough to result in
admission to acute wards of a psychiatric hospital, over 40% retain
DMC (Owen et al., 2008, 2009).
In persons with mild to moderate dementia, DMC may be present
most of the time, but be compromised on occasions by inter-current ill-
ness such as a urinary tract infection or an adverse reaction tomedication
for an unrelated disorder. As stated earlier, loss of DMCmay occur in any
person, whether they have a (pre-existing) condition associated with a
disability or not. Itmay be present forminutes (as in a hypoglycaemic re-
action in a person with diabetes), hours, days, or much longer. Also, as
mentioned earlier, DMC is ‘functionally’ assessed, and is not based on
‘status’ (such as having a diagnosis of ‘schizophrenia’).
Thus, taking some concrete examples, we suggest that each of the
following instances inwhich a person, despite support (or offers of sup-
port that are refused), continues to adamantly reject treatment as a re-
sult of an impairment of DMC can be regarded as, in principle, the same;
and, in each case non-consensual treatment could be justiﬁed if it were
in accordwith a form of subjective best interests, for example, following
the principles outlined in Appendix B:7 Ad Hoc Committee, Report of the Seventh Session, A/AC.265/2006/2 (13 Feb 2006).
1 A person with no physical or mental
illness
is struck by a car and sustains a severe
head injury causing a haemorrhage that
will result in death without surgical
intervention.
2 A person with a psychosis, stable and
experiencing no symptoms
3 A personwith a psychosis, with obvious
severe symptoms
4 A person with an intellectual disability
5 A person with previously good mental
abilities develops a delirium as a result
of the adverse effects of drug treatment
for heart failure
and refuses to eat or drink because he is
convinced all food given to him is
poisoned with the intention to kill him.
6 A person with a psychosis, usually
stable, develops a delirium as a result of
the adverse effects of drug treatment for
heart failure
7 A person with a psychosis, usually
stable and with good mental abilities,
suffers a relapse of the psychosis due to
‘crack’ cocaine use
8 A person with a psychosis, usually
stable and with good mental abilities,
suffers a relapse of the psychosis of
unknown cause
9 A person with an intellectual disability
who normally enjoys his food, after
being informed that he has a
lymphoma, a life threatening disease,
becomes psychoticThese cases, we argue, illustrate why there is good reason to sepa-
rate impaired DMC from ‘disability’ even though both may be present
at the same time. They show that each may occur independently, one
in the absence of the other. They are conceptually distinct. In this
sense, then, DMC can claim to be ‘disability neutral’ and a valid criterion
under the CRPD (in association with an appropriate test of subjective
best interests or ‘will and preferences’) for involuntary treatment.
Such treatment would be provided to those with disabilities ‘on an
equal basis with others’. Indeed, failure to provide treatment for a seri-
ous condition that is rejected as a result of a person's impaired DMC
would be in conﬂict with Article 25 of the CRPD:
‘States Parties recognize that persons with disabilities have the right to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health without dis-
crimination on the basis of disability’.
If non-consensual treatment is to be allowed, for example, in case 1
above, but not for 2, 3 or 4, then such discrimination is clearly aconsequence; or in case 5, but not 6. If allowed for cases 5 and 6, why
not for 7 and 8?
It seems unlikely that an intention behind the CRPD was to exclude
the possibility of all forms of non-consensual treatment in all cases, in-
cluding semi-coma or coma (which indeed would ensue in each of the
cases above if treatment were to be withheld). One draft7 of Article 17,
which was dropped after strong resistance from disability organisations
(Bartlett, 2012), included the following:
2. States Parties shall protect persons with disabilities from forced
intervention or forced institutionalisation aimed at correcting, im-
proving or alleviating any actual or perceived impairment.
3. In cases of medical emergency or issues of risk to public health in-
volving involuntary interventions, persons with disabilities shall be
treated on an equal basis with others.
4. States Parties shall ensure that involuntary treatment of persons
with disabilities is:
(a) Minimized through the active promotion of alternatives;
(b) Undertaken only in exceptional circumstances, in accordance
with procedures established by law and with the application
of appropriate legal safeguards;
(c) Undertaken in the least restrictive setting possible, and that the
best interests of the person concerned are fully taken into ac-
count;
(d) Appropriate for the person and provided without ﬁnancial cost
to the individual receiving the treatment or to his or her family.
One can understand the difﬁculties, especially with (4), which ap-
pears to be discriminatory, but the explicit reference to medical emer-
gencies seems to have been lost in the ﬁnal text of the CRPD. Article 17
has been left as a bald single sentence.
Article 25 (d) requires:
‘health professionals to provide care of the same quality to persons with
disabilities as to others, including on the basis of free and informed con-
sent by, inter alia, raising awareness of the human rights, dignity, au-
tonomy and needs of persons with disabilities through training and
the promulgation of ethical standards for public and private health
care’;
It would seemunreasonable to interpret 25 (d) as completely exclud-
ing involuntary treatment — under any circumstances, for anyone —
including case 1 above. If it is to be permitted for case 1, would it not
be a failure to provide ‘care of the same quality’ for cases 2, 3, 4, and
so on?
6. Conclusions
The CRPD poses major challenges for a justiﬁcation for involuntary
treatment that is not discriminatory. We welcome these challenges as
we maintain that existing mental health legislation is unfairly discrimi-
natory against people with a mental illness. Some have stated that the
CRPDmay effectively rule out involuntary treatment. However, we sug-
gest that very fewwould support the idea that the state never, even as a
last resort, has a duty to protect those who are clearly unable to make
crucial treatment decisions for themselves.We suggest that an impaired
decision-making capability approach, as in the Fusion Law proposal,
offers a non-discriminatory basis for involuntary treatment where
attempts at supported decision-making have proven unsuccessful. If it
is accepted that impaired DMC can be ‘disability-neutral’, as we have
argued, and that it may provide the gateway to a consideration of invol-
untary treatment, it cannot on its own justify involuntary treatment.
There still remains the thorny question of what further justiﬁcation is
required. A version of subjective best interests where the patient's
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and aims to give expression to the person's ‘will and preferences’. If
the person's will and preferences are endorsed and acted upon in this
manner, in an important sense, the decisionsmade are not ‘substituted’
ones. Arriving at what constitutes the person's ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ will
and preferences when there is a difference between those currently
expressed as opposed to those previously expressed may present difﬁ-
culties. There is clearly still much conceptual and practical work to be
done in developing these ideas.
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Appendix A. Articles of the Convention on the Rights of Personswith
Disabilities relevant to the discussion of involuntary treatment
Article 12
Equal recognition before the law
1. States Parties reafﬁrm that persons with disabilities have the right to
recognition everywhere as persons before the law.
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by
persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercis-
ing their legal capacity.
4. States Parties shall ensure that allmeasures that relate to the exercise
of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to
prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law.
Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise
of legal capacity respect the rights,will and preferences of the person,
are free of conﬂict of interest and undue inﬂuence, are proportional
and tailored to the person's circumstances, apply for the shortest
time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, inde-
pendent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards
shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect
the person's rights and interests.
5. Subject to the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take all ap-
propriate and effectivemeasures to ensure the equal right of persons
with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own
ﬁnancial affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages
and other forms of ﬁnancial credit, and shall ensure that persons
with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.
Article 14
Liberty and security of the person
1. States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities, on an equal
basis with others:
(a) Enjoy the right to liberty and security of person;
(b) Are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and
that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the law,
and that the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a
deprivation of liberty.
2. States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are de-
prived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal
basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with interna-
tional human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the
objectives and principles of this Convention, including by provision
of reasonable accommodation.Article 17
Protecting the integrity of the person
Every person with disabilities has a right to respect for his or her
physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others.
Article 25
Health
States Parties recognize that persons with disabilities have the right
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health without
discrimination on the basis of disability. States Parties shall take all
appropriate measures to ensure access for persons with disabilities to
health services that are gender-sensitive, including health-related reha-
bilitation. In particular, States Parties shall:
(a) Provide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality
and standard of free or affordable health care and programmes
as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual
and reproductive health and population-based public health
programmes;
(b) Provide those health services needed by personswith disabilities
speciﬁcally because of their disabilities, including early identiﬁ-
cation and intervention as appropriate, and services designed to
minimize and prevent further disabilities, including among chil-
dren and older persons;
(c) Provide these health services as close as possible to people's own
communities, including in rural areas;
(d) Require health professionals to provide care of the same quality
to persons with disabilities as to others, including on the basis
of free and informed consent by, inter alia, raising awareness of
the human rights, dignity, autonomy and needs of persons with
disabilities through training and the promulgation of ethical
standards for public and private health care;
(e) Prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in the
provision of health insurance, and life insurance where such in-
surance is permitted by national law, which shall be provided
in a fair and reasonable manner;
(f) Prevent discriminatory denial of health care or health services or
food and ﬂuids on the basis of disability.
Appendix B
‘Recommended decision-making principles’: from Victorian Law
Reform Commission Guardianship: Final Report (2012) p.399
Legislation should require substitute decisionmakers to exercise their
powers in a manner that promotes the personal and social wellbeing of
the represented person.
Substitute decisionmakers promote the personal and socialwellbeing
of the person when, as far as possible, they:
(a) have paramount regard to making the judgments and decisions
that the person would make themselves after due consideration
if able to do so
(b) act in consultation with the person, giving effect to their
wishes
(c) support the person to make or participate in decisions
(d) act as an advocate for the person, and promote and protect
their rights and dignity
(e) encourage the person to be independent and self-reliant
(f) encourage the person to participate in the life of the commu-
nity
(g) respect the person's supportive relationships, friendships and
connections with others
(h) recognise and take into account the person's cultural and lin-
guistic circumstances
(i) protect the person from abuse, neglect and exploitation.
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In determining the judgments and decisions a represented person
would make after due consideration, substitute decision makers should
be guided by:
(a) the wishes and preferences the person expresses at the time a
decision needs to be made, in whatever form the person ex-
presses them
(b) any wishes the person has previously expressed, in whatever
form the person has expressed them
(c) any considerations the person was unaware of when expressing
their wishes which are likely to have signiﬁcantly affected those
wishes
(d) any circumstances that have changed since the person expressed
their wishes which would be likely to signiﬁcantly affect those
wishes
(e) the history of the person, including their views, beliefs, values
and goals in life.
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